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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MICHAEL CLEGG, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20040426-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of theft by 
deception with two prior convictions, a third degree felony (R. 
132-33)• This court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (West 2005). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court plainly err in submitting the case 
to the jury or did defendant's attorney render ineffective 
assistance of counsel for not filing a motion for directed 
verdict, where the evidence amply established that defendant 
intentionally deceived the cashier into selling him items at a 
price lower than their retail value? 
To prevail on a claim of plain error, defendant must 
demonstrate that the trial court erred, that the error should 
have been obvious, and that, absent the error, he had a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). In reviewing a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must determine 
whether trial counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, 
whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. 
Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991). This claim presents 
a question of law, reviewed on the record of the underlying 
trial. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 111 16-17, L2 P.3d 
92. 
2. Would the outcome of the trial likely have been more 
favorable for defendant if defense counsel had requested or the 
trial court had given a jury instruction that did not apply to 
the facts of this case? 
Defendant frames this argument both in terms of ineffective 
assistance of counsel and plain error by the trial court. When 
both claims turn on the same set of facts, "a common standard is 
applicable." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n. 15 (Utah 
1989) . Both claims require that defendant establish prejudice or 
harm to the extent that the reviewing court's confidence in the 
outcome is undermined. Id. 
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3. Did the trial judge plainly err either by referencing 
his spouse's employment as a pharmacist at Walmart or by 
admonishing defendant about his disruptive courtroom behavior? 
The standard of review for a plain error claim is 
articulated in issue #1, supra. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (West 2005), governing theft by 
deception, provides: 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises control over property of another by 
deception and with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, 
however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance, or 
puffing by statements unlikely to deceive 
ordinary persons in the group addressed. 
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation 
of wares or worth in communications addressed 
to the public or to a class or group. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (West 2005), defining 
"deception," provides: 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person 
intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or 
conduct an impression of law or fact 
that is false and that the actor does 
not believe to be true and that is 
likely to affect the judgment of another 
in the transaction 
-3-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of theft by deception, 
enhanced to a third degree felony because he had two prior 
convictions (R. 24-25). After a preliminary hearing, he was 
bound over for trial, and a jury convicted him as charged (R. 21-
22, 51, 106). The trial court sentenced defendant to zero to 
five years in the Utah State Prison, to be served concurrently 
with sentences in three other cases (R. 132-35). Defendant filed 
this timely appeal (R. 137-40). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 28, 2001, Rainbow Palmer had been working as a 
Walmart cashier for approximately one month (R. 203: 114) . That 
evening, defendant and a friend came through her check stand with 
two carts full of merchandise, totaling $344.66 (R. 203: 114, 
117; R. 204: 169). Rainbow testified that as she checked 
defendant out, "[he] was talking to me the whole entire time, 
kind of confusing me and sidetracking me" (Id. at 118). She 
described him as "jittery," "just talking and talking and talking 
and talking" (Id. at 125, 136), She thought "he looked like he 
was under the influence of drugs" (Id. at 136). Rainbow 
described herself as feeling "very nervous" because of 
defendant's constant chatter and because she knew her customer 
service manager was watching her performance (Id. at 125, 136). 
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In the course of checking out, defendant handed Rainbow 
three unpackaged items: a butane torch head, an air pressure 
gauge, and a plastic sprinkler adapter (Id. at 73, 119). Rainbow 
looked for UPC stickers on the items but there were none (Id.). 
She testified: 
[Defendant] had handed me a piece of paper 
that said $2.74 with the little UPC thing on 
the bottom . . . . He said that, "These three 
items I found in the bulk back in hardware, 
and these are the prices." I said, "Are you 
sure?" He said yes. Because that's the only 
kind of authority I have as a Walmart 
associate is to say, "Are you sure?" 
(Id. at 120-21). Rainbow took "his word because at Walmart we go 
with customer satisfaction" (Id. at 119). She said, "I had a 
doubt, but I didn't question him" (Id.). Rainbow then rang all 
three items up at the price marked on the card: $2.74 (Id. at 
121) -1 
Unbeknownst to defendant, who had spent a considerable 
amount of time in the store, his conduct had attracted the 
attention of several Walmart loss prevention team members (Id. at 
92). Initially, a loss prevention agent observed defendant 
acting suspiciously and so contacted John Marketti, the loss 
prevention trainer (Id. at 57-58). Marketti testified that he 
had followed and watched defendant for "at least an hour" (Id. at 
63). He observed defendant "just acting in a really peculiar 
1
 The actual cost of the complete butane torch was $12.97; 
the air pressure gauge cost $14.96; and the sprinkler adapter 
cost approximately $3.70 (R. 204: 226). 
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manner" (Id. at 60). Defendant was "pacing up and down the 
aisle," "looking around to the left, to the right," "moving very 
sporadically through the store . . . almost to a pace where we 
had to . . .jog just to keep up" (Id. at 60, 62). 
Following defendant around the hardware department, Marketti 
watched defendant pick up a butane torch box, open it, remove 
only the torch head, put it in his cart, and then return the 
opened box with its remaining parts to a nearby shelf (Id. at 60-
61). Later, in the automotive department, Marketti saw defendant 
rip open a package containing an air pressure gauge, put the 
gauge in his basket, and then place the opened package behind 
some other items on a shelf (Id. at 63). 
The Walmart district supervisor, Bill Mowry, testified that 
he was only five feet away, just opposite defendant in the same 
aisle, when defendant took the butane torch box from the shelf, 
removed the torch head, and then replaced the box on the shelf 
(R. 204: 211, 228).2 Tyler Wilm, another loss prevention agent, 
also testified that he saw defendant take both the torch head and 
the air pressure gauge (R. 203: 142-43, 145). 
John Marketti watched defendant check out from about 10 feet 
away (Id. at 87) . He testified that defendant produced NNa price 
tag card of $2.74. Basically, he showed that card to the cashier 
2
 John Marketti and Tyler Wilm were watching defendant from 
either end of the same aisle in which Mowry and defendant were 
standing (R. 204: 211) . 
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and basically held out these items [i.e. the butane torch head, 
the air pressure gauge, and the plastic sprinkler adapter], 
making gestures that these items were that price for each one" 
(Id. at 66). Marketti testified that he was "99 percent sure" of 
the content of the conversation (Id. at 98). He also testified 
that the price card, which typically hung from a shelf to 
indicate the price of merchandise, in fact showed the price for a 
multi-purpose glue (Id. at 67, 68).3 
Tyler Wilm watched the checkout on an overhead surveillance 
camera, observing defendant "present[] all of his merchandise 
that he paid for first and then these last two items [i.e. the 
torch head and pressure gauge] he placed on the belt last along 
with a tag - shelf label which he had selected also from the 
hardware department that he presented to the cashier" (Id. at 
143) . 
After defendant finished checking out, he headed for the 
store exit. Once past all points of payment, the loss prevention 
team stopped him (Id. at 71, 148). The butane torch head, the 
air pressure gauge, and the plastic sprinkler adapter were all 
found in his shopping bags (Id. at 73). When matched to 
3
 Marketti conceded that the glue was located right above 
the sprinkler adapters and that defendant could conceivably have 
taken the card from between the shelves, thinking it applied to 
the adapter (R. 203: 100-01). He emphasized, however, "the 
regular person would just, you know, . . . have a price check 
done. They wouldn't carry that thing with them and say that that 
price is for that item and the two other items that they . . . 
took out of the packaging" (Id. at 102). 
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defendant's receipt, none of the items showed up by name or 
proper price (Id. at 74). Three items, however, each priced at 
$2.74, did appear, "back-to-back three in a row" (Id.). When 
questioned, defendant told Bill Mowry that he had paid for the 
torch head, the pressure gauge, and the sprinkler adapter (R. 
204: 242). 
Defendant testified in his own behalf. He asserted that he 
had spent a long time at Walmart on two successive evenings, 
shopping both for his business partner and for parts he could use 
in his own inventions (Id. at 166, 168). Although he sought help 
from Walmart personnel, no one was available (Id. at 168). 
Consequently, he opened the butane torch and the pressure gauge 
packages to assess for himself whether the thread patterns were 
what he needed for his work (Id. at 168-69). He discovered they 
were not but nonetheless put the items in his basket (Id. at 170, 
184). Defendant also found a plastic sprinkler adapter that "was 
perfect for what I wanted, but it wasn't in a package" (Id. at 
169) . Seeing a nearby price card, he took it from the shelf, 
thinking it indicated the price of the adapter (Id.). 
Defendant testified that at check out, he told the cashier 
that he did not want to buy either the torch head or the pressure 
gauge (Id. at 170, 178, 184). He did, however, want to purchase 
the plastic sprinkler adapter (Id. at 178). Consequently, he 
presented the price card to Rainbow and said, "I don't know if 
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this [i.e. the price card] is this [i.e. the sprinkler adapter]" 
(Id. at 171). He testified, "I handed her the thing [i.e. the 
price card]. It's her job to tell me" (Id.). According to 
defendant, she agreed that the card seemed to go with the adapter 
and rang it up (Id.). 
In defendant's view, he never intended to buy either the 
torch head or the pressure gauge (Id. at 183-84). He testified 
that he gave both items to Rainbow, telling her he did not wish 
to purchase them (Id. at 174). His intent, he maintained, was to 
return the items from the opened packages to the front of the 
store for restocking and to purchase only the sprinkler adapter 
(Id. at 170, 184, 202). He testified that he did not see the 
cashier put the items in his shopping bag because he thought she 
was cute and was flirting with her as she checked him out (Id. at 
169, 178, 183). 
After the jury considered all of the evidence, it convicted 
defendant of theft by deception (R. 106). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first contends that the trial court plainly erred 
by submitting the case to the jury because the evidence did not 
suffice to establish a statutory "deception." He argues that his 
offer of a price was not "likely to affect the judgment" of a 
more competent Walmart cashier, as required by the statute 
defining deception. Thus, where the cashier in this case freely 
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chose to accept his offer, he is not culpable. This argument 
fails at the outset because it ignores two of the three elements 
of the statutory definition of deception. Moreover, his argument 
ignores the close nexus between defendant's words and conduct and 
the transaction. When all the evidence of defendant's conduct is 
examined, there was ample evidence for the jury to conclude that 
defendant committed theft by deception. Defendant's related 
argument, that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move 
for a directed verdict, also fails. If the evidence was 
sufficient to support a conviction, then moving for a directed 
verdict would have been futile and, hence, not grounds for an 
ineffectiveness claim. 
Second, defendant argues that the outcome of the trial would 
have been more favorable if his counsel had requested or the 
trial court had sua sponte given a jury instruction on "puffing," 
a statutory defense to theft by deception. This argument is 
unavailing, not only because defendant never argued puffing as a 
defense below, but also because the facts of this case simply do 
not involve puffing. Plainly, failure to instruct the jury on an 
inapplicable defense could not have prejudiced the outcome of the 
case. 
Finally, the trial judge did not plainly err either by 
mentioning his spouse's employment as a Walmart pharmacist or by 
admonishing defendant about his disruptive courtroom behavior. 
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As to spousal employment, the remarks may well have been 
gratuitous. Defendant, however, has failed to explain how the 
alleged error was obvious and how the absence of those remarks 
would have realistically created a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome. As to the behavioral admonishment, it is 
the court's prerogative and responsibility to control the 
courtroom and manage the proceedings. Mere expressions of 
annoyance and even anger by the court are ordinarily insufficient 
to support a bias charge. Here, where the jury was the fact 
finder, defendant has failed to persuasively demonstrate any 
connection between the court's comment and the substantive 
outcome of the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR 
IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY 
NOR DID DEFENSE COUNSEL RENDER 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
FOR NOT FILING A MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THE EVIDENCE 
AMPLY ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT 
INTENTIONALLY DECEIVED THE CASHIER 
INTO SELLING HIM ITEMS AT AN 
INCORRECT PRICE 
Defendant first argues that the trial court committed plain 
error by submitting the case to the jury because the evidence did 
not suffice to establish a "deception" within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5). See Br. of Aplt. at 24-25. Because 
defendant did not preserve the issue at trial by filing an 
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appropriate motion, he relies on a plain error argument on 
appeal. See State v. Holqate, 2000 UT 74, 116, 10 P.3d 346 
(generally, in order to preserve issue for appeal, defendant must 
raise sufficiency claim by proper motion). "[T]o establish plain 
error, a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and 
second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that 
the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Id. 
at 111. Only after the defendant convincingly makes an initial 
showing of insufficiency will the appellate court "determine 
whether the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental 
that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury." Id. at 
518. 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish a statutory deception because the State did not show 
that any false communication he made or implied to the cashier as 
to the price of the three items at issue [was] ^likely to affect' 
her judgment" (Br. of Aplt. at 26).4 This argument turns on Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5), defining "deception" as follows: 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person 
intentionally: 
4
 Defendant makes another, essentially identical argument, 
based not on section 76-6-401 (5) (a), but on an inapplicable 
subsection of the theft by deception statute. See Br. of Aplt. 
at 28-29. This argument is addressed comprehensively in Point 
Two of the State's brief. 
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(a) Creates or confirms by words or 
conduct an impression of law or fact 
that is false and that the actor does 
not believe to be true and that is 
likely to affect the judgment of another 
in the transaction 
The essence of defendant's argument is that his misleading words 
and actions were unlikely to affect the judgment of a more 
competent Walmart cashier than the one he happened to approach. 
He asserts that the cashier "made a choice not to follow 
procedures, not to contact her CSM [customer service manager], 
and not to do a price check on the three items. [Defendant] 
simply made an offer of a price which was accepted by the 
cashier'' (Br. of Aplt. at 28). In defendant's view, then, making 
a purchase at Walmart constitutes an exercise in bartering, 
governed by a "seller beware" rule of law. 
Defendant's argument lacks merit for several reasons. 
First, it guts the statutory definition of deception by ignoring 
the first two elements of the definition. In defendant's view, a 
buyer can knowingly create a false impression, but if the cashier 
accepts his false impression, then no deception has occurred. 
Such an interpretation violates the plain language of the statute 
and, for that reason, should be rejected. See, e.g., State v. 
Martinez, 2002 UT 80, 58, 52 P.3d 1276 (when interpreting 
statutes, look first to plain statutory language and avoid 
interpretations that render portions of statute superfluous) . 
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Second, defendant misinterprets the statutory phrase, 
"likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction," by 
assuming that the response of the cashier in the transaction 
defines his culpability for a deception, regardless of his intent 
or conduct. This Court has noted, however, that the phrase is 
meant "to test the relationship between the falsehood and the 
transaction, so as to determine if a deception exists." State v. 
LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681, 686 n.9 (Utah App. 1992). Here, the 
testimony of all witnesses, including defendant, demonstrated a 
close nexus between defendant's falsehood and the transaction. 
John Marketti, the Walmart loss prevention trainer, testified 
that he personally saw defendant remove both the butane torch 
head from its box and the pressure gauge from its packaging and 
then put both items in his cart (R. 203: 60, 63). He also 
personally watched as defendant showed the cashier a price tag of 
$2.74 and then gestured that the items, plus a sprinkler adapter, 
were that price (Id. at 66) . 
Tyler Wilm, a loss prevention agent, testified that he also 
saw defendant remove the butane torch head and the pressure gauge 
from their packaging, and that he saw defendant put these items 
on the belt, along with a shelf label that defendant had procured 
in the hardware department (Id. at 142, 143, 145). 
Bill Mowry, a Walmart district supervisor, testified that he 
was less than five feet away when defendant removed the butane 
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torch head from the box and returned the box to the shelf (R. 
204: 211). He further testified that after he stopped defendant, 
defendant denied removing any items from their packaging and 
maintained he had paid for the torch, the gauge, and the adapter 
(Id. at 217, 242). Mowry also testified that he saw defendant 
hand the cashier the $2.74 price tag before she rung up the three 
items (Id^ at 225). 
Rainbow Palmer, the cashier, testified that when she reached 
the three unpackaged items, she asked defendant about the lack of 
wrapping. He told her that he found the three items in a bulk 
section in hardware and handed her a price tag of $2.74 (R. 203: 
119-22, 135-36) . Because none of the items displayed UPC 
stickers and Walmart "goes with customer satisfaction,'' Rainbow 
asked him, "Are you sure?" and he responded that he was. Only 
then did she ring each item up at $2.74 (Id. at 119r 120-21). 
Even the testimony of defendant illustrates the closeness of 
the nexus between his conduct and words and the transaction. 
Defendant admitted removing both the torch head from its box and 
the pressure gauge from its packaging (R. 204: 168). He put the 
items in his basket and brought them to the checkout stand (Id. 
at 170, 180, 183-84, 202). He also testified that he removed a 
$2.74 price card that he found on the shelf near a sprinkler 
adapter he wanted to buy and brought the price card with him to 
expedite his checkout (Id. at 168, 178, 181-82). He also 
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admitted handing all three items to the cashier, along with the 
price card (Id. at 171, 174) . 
Under these circumstances, the evidence sufficed to show 
that defendant's representations created an impression of fact 
that was not true, both to the cashier and to other witnesses in 
the store. Whether defendant also knew these representations to 
be false depends on a credibility assessment, plainly within the 
province of the jury as fact-finder. Seey e.g.. State v. 
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) (jury serves as exclusive 
judge of both credibility of witnesses and weight to be accorded 
the evidence). Certainly, given the testimony of all the store 
personnel, defendant's conduct was plainly likely to affect the 
judgment of a cashier checking out a customer who made such 
representations. No more is necessary to establish a deception 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 76-6-401(5)(a). 
Defendant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to move for a directed verdict on the ground that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish a deception. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 30. Defendant acknowledges that such a claim can only 
succeed A>>if the State's evidence was not sufficient to support a 
conviction.'" Id. (quoting State v. Reves, 2000 UT App 310, 56). 
But x>[s]o long as there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of 
the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. 
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Mead, 2001 UT 58, 167, 27 P.3d 1115 (quotation and citation 
omitted). Here, the evidence sufficed to establish that 
defendant deceived the cashier within the meaning of the relevant 
statute. Accordingly, had defense counsel moved for a directed 
verdict, the trial court would have denied the motion. Such a 
motion, therefore, would have been futile. The law is well-
settled that trial counsel's failure to raise a futile objection 
cannot be grounds for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 2000 UT 41, 526, 1 P.3d 546. 
POINT TWO 
THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL WOULD 
LIKELY HAVE BEEN NO MORE FAVORABLE 
TO DEFENDANT IF DEFENSE COUNSEL HAD 
REQUESTED OR THE TRIAL COURT HAD 
GIVEN A JURY INSTRUCTION THAT DID 
NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
The statutory definition of theft by deception, with which 
the jury was instructed, provides that "[a] person commits theft 
if he obtains or exercises control over property of another by 
deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-405(1) (West 2005). Under the rubrics of plain error 
and ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant asserts that he 
should have received an instruction on a second subsection of the 
same statute, which articulates a defense to theft by deception. 
That section provides: 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, 
however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance, or 
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puffing by statements unlikely to deceive 
ordinary persons in the group addressed. 
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation 
of wares or worth in communications addressed 
to the public or to a class or group. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(2). 
Pursuant to ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant 
contends "that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 
request that the jury be instructed on the entire statutory 
definition of theft by deception - which included the defense set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(2)." Br. of Aplt. at 31. He 
asserts that he was prejudiced because his defense "was 
implicitly based on the statutory defense of subsection (2)" and 
that, had the jury been so instructed, the outcome of his trial 
would likely have been more favorable. Id. at 34.5 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a 
showing of deficient performance and prejudice. State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 11 16-17, 12 P.3d 92. Where subsection 
(2) of the theft by deception statute does not apply to the facts 
of his case, defendant fails to show either. Consequently, a 
5
 Defendant also contends that the trial court committed 
plain error when it failed to inform the jury of the entire 
statutory definition of theft by deception. Br. of Aplt. at 33. 
A claim of plain error requires a showing of obvious legal error 
and prejudice. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
As explained infra, the court did not commit error because 
subsection (2) was inapplicable to the facts before the court. 
For the same reason, defendant could not have suffered any 
prejudice. And even if there had been error, it would not have 
been obvious where defendant failed to object to the instruction 
as given. 
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jury instruction that included subsection (2) could make no 
possible difference to the outcome of his case. 
By its plain language, the statutory defense articulated in 
subsection (2) rests on one of two conditions: either there must 
be "falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance," or 
"puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in 
the group addressed." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(2). Defendant 
asserts only the latter circumstance, that his actions at check 
out constituted "puffing" (Br. of Aplt. at 33). 
The statutory defense in subsection (2) defines "puffing" as 
"an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications 
addressed to the public or to a class or group."6 It thus refers 
to exaggerated talk or braggadocio, usually uttered by a seller 
who is trying to influence a buyer. In the context of theft by 
deception, a classic example of puffing would be a car dealer who 
6
 The term "puffing" is most typically used in the 
commercial law context and has been described as "*[t]he general 
praise of his own wares by a seller . . . for the purpose of 
enhancing them in the buyer's estimation.'" Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 
2002 UT 83, 1 13 n.2, 54 P.3d 1131 (quoting Hirshberg Optical Co. 
v. Dalton, Nye & Cannon Co., 27 P.3d 83 (1891). In older cases, 
puffing is referred to as "sales talk." See, e.g., Christopher 
v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 1013 (Utah 1976); 
Welchman v. Wood, 353 P.2d 165, 167 (Utah 1960). In the criminal 
context, this Court has suggested that a defendant's statement to 
an officer that he was not afraid of a man named Olsen and could 
"kick Olson's ass" might well be "^macho' hyperbole rather than a 
definitive admission that defendant had no fear of Olsen" and 
thus an example of "the criminal law equivalent of ^puffing.'" 
State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688, 693 (Utah App. 1989). 
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overstates the value or condition of a used car to a prospective 
customer. The dealer's "exaggerated commendation'' would involve 
praise that enlarges beyond the bounds of truth, that 
misrepresents by inflating value beyond what is warranted by 
fact. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 456, 790 
(1993). 
This case does not involve puffing. Defendant was the 
buyer, not the seller. Moreover, he did not overstate the value 
of the items in his cart. He understated their value by 
presenting a price tag that corresponded to a less expensive 
item. Under such circumstances, defendant could not successfully 
assert puffing as a defense to theft by deception. Accordingly, 
his counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to request an 
instruction on puffing as a defense, and defendant suffered no 
prejudice as a result. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT PLAINLY ERR 
EITHER BY REFERENCING HIS SPOUSE'S 
EMPLOYMENT AS A PHARMACIST AT 
WALMART OR BY ADMONISHING DEFENDANT 
ABOUT HIS DISRUPTIVE COURTROOM 
BEHAVIOR 
Defendant argues that the trial court twice committed plain 
error: first, by referencing his wife's employment as a 
pharmacist at Walmart; and second, by admonishing defendant to 
control his erratic behavior during trial. See Br. of Aplt. at 
36-37, 38-39. Defendant asserts that "the trial court's comments 
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at the very least created the appearance of bias" (Id. at 36). 
At most, he contends, these comments bolstered the State's case, 
thereby tipping the scales against him and, consequently, 
prejudicing the outcome of his trial (Id. at 41). 
Defendant brings his claim under the rubric of plain error 
because he did not follow the normal channel for asserting and 
preserving a claim of judicial bias by filing a motion to 
disqualify the judge. See State v. Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, 19, 
37 P.3d 1180; Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c) (West 2004). To prevail on a 
claim of plain error, defendant must demonstrate that the trial 
court erred, that the error should have been obvious, and that, 
absent the error, he had a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 
1993). 
A. Trial judge's comments about spousal employment. 
Defendant first complains that the court plainly erred in 
commenting about his wife's employment as a pharmacist at Walmart 
(Br. of Aplt. at 36-38). Specifically, he asserts that the court 
erred in making "unnecessary and inappropriate" remarks that 
"highlight[ed] [the trial court's] family's connection to 
Walmart" (Id. at 37, 38). Notably, however, Defendant concedes 
that he "is not arguing here that the trial court committed plain 
error in failing to recuse himself because his wife worked at the 
Walmart store" (Br. of Aplt. at 38). Rather, his claim seems 
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limited to an assertion that the trial court should not have 
mentioned his wife's employment in front of the jury because a 
reasonable juror would then question the court's impartiality 
(Id.). Defendant so frames the issue in order to fit "the basic 
test cited by this Court in reviewing the trial court's denial of 
a recusal motion" (Id.). Defendant, however, did not file a 
recusal motion. Consequently, his claim must be considered under 
the rubric of plain error, not as an appeal from the denial of a 
motion to disqualify. 
The judge made two remarks to which defendant now objects. 
The first occurred during jury voir dire, where the following 
interchange occurred: 
Court: Now let me first ask what may seem 
to be a very peculiar question. Do 
any of you work for Walmart 
Corporation, either at stores or at 
the distribution center? If you do 
would you raise your hand? All 
right, I've got a hand. Ma'am, 
what's your name? 
Juror: Crystal Hyatt. 
Court: All right. Ms. Hyatt, I'm going to 
excuse you right now, and that's 
not unusual. My wife also works 
for Walmart. She's a pharmacist 
for them right now. But Walmart is 
involved in this case and so we're 
excusing anybody who's from 
Walmart. Thank you, Ms. Hyatt. 
You can go. 
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R. 203: 8-9. The second remark occurred at the end of the first 
day of trial when, in admonishing the jury to refrain from 
discussing the case, the judge said: 
Do any of you have crying need to go to the 
Walmart in Washington today? I have to go 
there and pick up my wife from work, but I'm 
not going to try to learn anything about the 
case there; I promise you. Please don't do 
that yourself. 
Id. at 160. 
Defendant contends that the impropriety of these remarks 
"should have been patently obvious to the trial court" (Id. at 
38). He alleges that the remarks prejudiced the outcome of his 
trial because the evidence for conviction was so marginal that, 
absent the comments, he would have enjoyed a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome (Id. at 41).7 
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the trial court's 
comment was "inappropriate," defendant has only speculated that 
any alleged error was either obvious or prejudicial. "To show 
obviousness of the error, [defendant] must show that the law was 
clear at the time of trial." State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, 
56, 18 P.3d 1123; accord State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 
App. 1997) ("Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial court's 
7
 The role of a pharmacist in a large corporate entity, 
however, so significantly attenuated from the retail functions 
implicated in this case that it is difficult to see how the 
judge's reference to his wife's employment could be construed as 
anything more than a gratuitous or unnecessary remark, much less 
a prejudicial one. 
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error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to 
guide the trial court"). In this case, defendant has not cited — 
nor could he cite — any legal authority rendering such a comment 
legally wrong. 
Furthermore, defendant has failed to demonstrate that, 
absent the comments, the outcome of the trial would have been 
more favorable to him. And, indeed, it would not have been. The 
jury was the fact finder, not the judge; defendant concedes that 
the jury was properly instructed on its role as fact finder; and 
the evidence against defendant was substantial. Because 
defendant has wholly failed to demonstrate how the judge's 
passing comments about his wife's employment could have convinced 
a jury to convict him, his claim fails. 
B. Trial judge's admonishment of defendant. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court committed plain 
error by admonishing him about his disruptive courtroom behavior. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 38-40. Following cross examination of a 
prosecution witness, just before redirect examination, the court 
interjected: 
Give me just a minute. Mr. Clegg, I have 
patiently put up with your unusual behavior, 
your untoward behavior, your outbursts, your 
fighting with your counsel, the miserable 
display that you have put on while seated 
there at counsel table. You will now sit 
quietly and still for the rest of these 
proceedings. Don't make any noises. Don't 
move your arms or hands. Don't move your 
head. Be still. 
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R. 204: 241. Defendant argues that this statement "was 
inappropriate and demonstrated bias against him which influenced 
the jury" (Br. of Aplt. at 39). The error, he contends, was 
obvious because "it did not promote judicial impartiality" (Id. 
at 40). He asserts it was prejudicial because it "highlighted 
the disdain and frustration the trial court felt towards him" 
(Id. at 41). 
Defendant's argument fails because he has not demonstrated 
error, much less that it was both obvious and prejudicial. The 
law is well-settled that the court has not only the prerogative 
but also the inherent power to control the courtroom and manage 
the trial process. State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 33, 59, 24 P.3d 
936; State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 570, 979 P.2d 799. Here, 
defendant himself concedes that he "offer[ed] verbal 
interjections during the testimony of other witnesses" and 
"verbally disagreed with his counsel" on multiple occasions (Br. 
of Aplt. at 38). The court tolerated defendant's repeated 
interruptions until the last witness testified, at which point 
the court finally intervened. 
This Court has noted that "[m]ere ^expressions of 
impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger' are 
insufficient to establish the existence of bias or partiality." 
Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. DeBrv, 2001 UT App 397, 525, 38 
P.3d 984 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 
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(1994)). Similarly, remarks that are "^critical or disapproving 
of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, 
ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.'" Id. 
Where defendant objects to the trial court's comments 
seeking only to modify defendant's aberrant conduct, those 
comments, without more, are insufficient to establish trial court 
error. And, in any event, "for ^alleged bias . . . to be 
disqualifying [it] must . . . result in an opinion on the merits 
on some basis other than what the judge learned from his 
participation in the case.'" Id. (citation omitted). In this 
case, where the fact finding function rested exclusively with the 
jury, defendant has failed to persuasively demonstrate any 
connection between the court's comment and the substantive 
outcome of the case. For this additional reason, defendant's 
claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count of theft by deception with two prior 
convictions, a third degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2±1 daY o f June, 2005. 
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